Jean v Jean (Born Dora) (MA 173 of 2024 (Arising in DC 118 of 2019)) [2024] SCSC 196 (2 December 2024)

Jean v Jean (Born Dora) (MA 173 of 2024 (Arising in DC 118 of 2019)) [2024] SCSC 196 (2 December 2024)

Adeline J

INTRODUCTION
[1]        This ruling pertains  to an application  on notice  by the Petitioner,  one Jolmny Wilvene Jean for different  reliefs  that would  effectively  allow the Petitioner  to file his petition in COUli for a property  order  in settlement  of the Matrimonial  property   issue between him   and  one  Fadeque,   Josianne,   Jean  bom   Dora   ("the  Respondent")    out  of  the prescriptive  limitation  period.  In his application,  the Petitioner  applies for the following orders-,

a.   'for the matter to be heard as a matter of urgency
b.  for an order to condone the delay infiling this application, and
c.  for an order for  leave to be granted for  the Applicant/Petitioner to file an application for  leave to pursue  the division of his share of matrimonial property following divorce"

[1]        The  application   is made  pursuant  to  rule  20  of the Matrimonial   Causes  Rules  ("the Rules")  which  remain  inforce  although  the  Matrimonial   Causes  Act  has  since  been repealed  and  the relevant  statutory  provisions   governing  property  adjustment   orders following  divorce  are now  prescribed   under  the Civil  Code of Seychelles  Act,  2020. Rule 20 of the Rules  is couched  in the following  terms.

"20. No pleadings shall befiled out of time without leave Application for leave shall be by motion supported by affidavit".

PLEADINGS
[2]        In acknowledgement   by the Petitioner,  that the time prescribed  under rule 34 (1) of the Rules  to make  this application  has  lapsed,  the Petitioner  seeks for leave  of this Court to  file his  application   out of time.  For  ease  of reference,  rule  34 (1) of the  Rules  is couched  in the following  terms;

"34  (1) an application for  a periodical payment or a lump sum payment in accordance with rule 4(1) (b) or c in relation toproperty in accordance with 4 (1), (t), (h), (1) or 0) where a prayerfor  the same has not been included in the petition for divorce or nullity of marriage may be made by the petitioner at any time after the expiration of the time for  appearance to the petition,  but no application shall be made later than two months aOerorder absolute except by leave. "(the underlined emphasis is mine).
 
[3]        To support  his application  for leave  of this COUli for the reliefs being sought for, the Petitioner has swom an affidavit attached thereto to which are exhibited the necessary relevant documents. In   his affidavit in support, interalia,   the Petitioner depones by making the following averments;

1)


2)   "That  by virtue  of a decree  of divorce  absolute  we finally  divorced  on 23rd June  2020,   but we did not pursue  the division  of our matrimonial property    issues   until   now.   (Copy   of  Decree   Absolute   of  Divorce attached  and marked  as exhibit  1)

3)   That during  the Course of our marriage  the Respondent  and I acquired a portion  of land more fully  1000wnas Land  title LD 252 consisting  of 2,119 square  metres  of land on which stands  our matrimonial  home and presently   registered   in the joint   names  of myself  and the Respondent (Copy of official search  Certificate  attached  and marked as Exhibit  2)

4)   That   the  purchase    of  title  LD   252,  and   the  development    of  the matrimonial  property  was carried  out by both parties.

5)   That   around   4  years   ago,  I  built   a  small   gym   business   on   the matrimonial  property  which is my sole business  and source of income.

6)   That since  our separation  and the continuous  abuse of my rights to live in  the house,  I was  obliged  to vacate  and  set  up a small  living  area outside  of the house on the same property

7)  That the Respondent  has on many occasions  causes problems  and makes all  sorts  of  allegations   towards  me  before  the  Family   Tribunal  and towards people  who comes  to the matrimonial property  to visit me even my own relatives.

8)   That during  the divorce process  a letter was written  to Ms Joel Camille attorney-at-law   of the Respondent   to offer  the Respondent  to purchase my undivided  halfright   in the matrimonial  property.   She did not reply to my offer. (Copy of letter attached  and marked  as exhibit  3)

9)  Since the divorce, 1 have vacated matrimonial property  and have moved on with my life and have since  emarry.

10) That it isjust and necessaryfor this honourable Court to make an order to have the matrimonial property subdivided in half each party to have a portion of land duly registered in our respective names

11) That 1 am,based on La Digue and working every day and through my indvertance Ifailed  to applyfor  a division of our matrimonial property within the period prescribed  by law and it is now urgent, just  and necessary that 1 and the Respondent have all our Matrimonial issues finalised once andfor all. "

[4]    In reply to the application for an extension of time to file application for a property adjustment or settlement order, the Respondent raises a plea  in limine litis in the following terms."

"The Respondent avers, that the Application is bad in law and must be dismisses in that the cause of action forming the basis of the Applicant's petition has previously been dealt with in case Jean v Jean (MA 25912020 arising in DV 11812019) whereby the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of the Petitioner. Accordingly, the matter is Resjudicata. "


[5]       In addition, to take issue with the averments made by the Petitioner, on merits, the Respondent did file an affidavit in reply. In her affidavit in reply, the Respondent, interalia makes the following averments-,

1)   "


2)  1 state that 1 am, objecting to the motion seeking leave of the Court by the Petitioner for  the Petitioner  to .file his petition for  division of matrimonial property out of time.
 
3)  I further    avers,  that I am advised  by my Attorney,   and  verily  believe  that the matter  has previously   been  dealt  with  in case  Jean   V Jean  (MA  25912020, arising  in DV  11812019) whereby  the Supreme  Court dismissed  the petition  of the Petitioner.   I state that the petitioner   is now seeking for  him to re litigate 011 a matter already determined by th.isCourt. There is now attached shown to me and marked as exhibit R1 a copy of the said judgement of the Supreme Court.

4)  I further  aver  that in any  event, the Petitioner  has advanced no  reasons whatsoever to the Court in this present application, tojustify the delays in him, for failing to file his petition within the prescribed time. I also aver that as per the above referred judgement,  the Petitioner was advised by the trialjudge on the need to seek leave to file  his petition out of time. However, the Petitioner fails  to take steps to rectify his petition then, and accordingly his petition was dismissed. The Petitioner accordingly has no reasonable basis to make this application.

5)  I aver that for the above reasons, I will object to the motion of the Petitioner, and moves the Court to dismiss it with costs ".

SUBMISSIONS
[6]        Leamed    Counsel   representing    the  parties in this  petition,   did  file  their   written submissions   to elaborate  and bring  clarity  to their  position  amid  the proposition  that this petition  is res judicata.  In its submissions  in support  of such proposition,  leamed counsel  for the Respondent   contends,  that  the application   is bad  in law and must  be dismisses  in that, the cause of action  forming  the basis  of the Applicant's   petition  has previously  been dealt with in case Jean vs Jean (MA 25912020,arising in D V 11812019) whereby  the supreme  COUlt  dismissed  the petition  of the Petitioner.

[7]        It is the submission  of learned  counsel,  that the Petitioner  has sought  for an order for the  final  division   of  the  parties'   matrimonial   property   title  LD252  and  the  house thereon,   in  particular,   to  declare   the  parties'   respective   shares  in  the  matrimonial property  and that in a judgement   dated  14th December  2023, Pillay J was satisfied,  that the  Petitioner  had  not  sought  for leave  of the  Court  to  file his petition  out of time. Learned  counsel  quotes  Pillay J as having  said the following  at paragraph   [12] of the judgement;

"12 I am inclined to agree that non-compliance with time limits arefatal to the case. However as stated by the learned chiefjustice in Sabadin some indulgence should be exercised not only to bring an end to the dispute between parties but also, because of the nature of the matter being the settlement of matrimonial property following  a divorce. However,  in the case of Sabadin above, the learned chief justice  seems to have reluctantly agreed to overlook the non­ compliance since the other party in the matter did not take up any objections. In contracts, the respondent in the current matter has taken up objection. With that in mind along with the fact that the matter was bought to the attention of the petitioner's  counsel who did not seek to rectify the situation, I have to decline  any  indulgence to the Petitioner. I  accordingly find  that the non­ compliance with Rule 34 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules is fatal  to the position, "

[8]        I  wholly   agree  with  the  finding  and  reasoning   of  Pillay  j  based  on  the  facts  and circumstances   of the case that were presented  before  the COUli. I am in no doubt that I would  have  reached  the  same  conclusion  for the  following  reasons,  (1) there was an objection  of non-compliance,   and (2) no steps were taken by the Petitioner  to comply. This was a procedural  lapsed and it was fatal. As such, indulgence  could not have come into play.

[9]        This petition  is a new one which  in effect is one where  the Petitioner  seeks to comply with the 111leprescribed  under 111le34 (1) of the Matrimonial  Rules. The question  that therefore  follows  is, does the averment  by learned  counsel  for the Respondent  that the Petitioner,  having  instituted  proceedings   to seek  for an extension  of time  to file the petition  proper  after the same was dismissed  for non-compliance   with procedural  law, makes  the petition  res judicata?
 
[10]      In his submissions  to expound  on his proposition  that the matter  is res judicata,  leamed counsel  refers  the  Court  to  Article   1351 of  the  Civil  Code  of  Seychelles  Act  with emphasis  on the threefold,  notably,  identity of subj ect matter, cause and parties between the first and second  case. It is the submission  ofleamed   counsel, that the subject matter is the same being that of division  of matrimonial  property between  parties, cause relates to the petition  for same division  of matrimonial  property  and the parties  are clearly the same patties  as in DV  118/19.

[11]      However,   leamed   counsel  for  the  Respondent   needs  to be  reminded,   that  in J ohny Wilven  Jean V Fadette  Josiane  Jean bom Dora (MA259/2020) (Arising  in DV118/19) the  petition  was  for division  of matrimonial   property  based  on the  substantive  law, whereas,  in the instant  case, the application  is for an extension  of time to file petition for division  of matrimonial  property   out oftime  based  on procedural  law.

[12]      In his  submissions   in reply,  leamed  counsel  for the Petitioner  submits,  that  the case proper  pertains  to the Matrimonial   property  of the parties  which  is yet to be fully and finally  settled  between  them,  whereas,  the Petitioner's   current  application  before  this Court is for leave to file an application  to have the matrimonial  property  issue between the patties  resolved  out of time,  and therefore,  looking  at the reliefs  being  sought  for, there are two separate  causes.

[13]      Leamed  counsel  also submits,  that the dismissal  of the application  filed out of time as MA259  of2020   for division  of matrimonial  property   was because  leave had not been sought prior doesn't  follow that the Court has determined  the application  for a property adjustment   order  or  a  division   of  matrimonial   property   between   the  parties   as  a settlement.

[14]      To aver against  the motion  that res judicata  is a bar to this proceeding,  learned counsel relies  on  an extract  quoted  from  the judgement   in the case  of Roger  Vs Smart Vega Holdings  Ltd (MA162/2024 arising in CSI02/2022) in which case Esparon j had commented  as follows-,
 
"Hence,  1 am  in  agreement   with  the submission   of  learned  counsel  for   the applicant  that for  the principle  of res judicata   to be applicable,  there must be a finality   of judgement   also and that in the present  matter  there  is no finality   of judgment   since  the Court  has not given  a judgement   on the merit  in the main case. Hence,  Ifind   that the plea  of res judicata   is not applicable  in the present matter,  and as a result 1 accordingly  dismiss  the plea  of res judicata.

[15]      Learned  counsel  for the  Petitioner   also  finds  it helpful  to refer  to what  he calls  the "pragmatic   approach"   which  this  court  took  in Rose  V Richmond   (MA97  of 2022) [2022]  SCSC/124   (15 December  2022)  in which  case  although  the court found  that there were  some defects  in the affidavit,  the COUliwent on as to state the following  -,

"On  merit,  I have,  amongst  other  things, given  thought  to  the possible repercussions or implications, should the Court deny the Applicant/Petitioner the remedy being sought for given the right to property which is afforded to evelY individual under Article 26(1)  of the charter of human rights in our constitution. Therefore, 1 am of the view, that in order to uphold that right, and in the interest ofjustice, the remedy being soughtfor should be granted to allow proceedings to proceed for ajust determination of the property issues between the parties. "

[16]      Learned  counsel  for the Petitioner  then proceeds  to submit  on the law of res judicata.

In  this  regard,  it is the submission  of learned  counsel,  that res judicata   is prescribed under  Article  1351 of the Civil Code of Seychelles  Act in the following  terms;

1)   "A final judgement  has the effect of res judicata  only in respect of the subject matter of thejudgement.

2)  It is necessary that the demand relate to the same subject matter, that it be between the same parties, and that it be bought by them or against them in the same capacities. "

[17]      Learned  counsel  cites the case of Hoareau  v Hemrick  [1973]  SLR 272,273,   in which case  Souyave  CJ, had  stated,  that  for res judicata  to apply  there  must  be three-fold, identity  of subject matter,  cause and parties in the first and subsequent  case. In Hoareau, (supra)  Souyave  CJ, had made the point that for a plea of res judicata  to be applicable, there  must  be  between  the  first  case  and the  second  case,  the  three-fold   identity  of "object"   "cause:"   and  "personnes".   It is  the  submission   of  leamed   counsel  for  the Applicant/Petitioner    that "the  object  is what  is claimed,  "La  cause"  is the fact, or the act, whence  the right  springs"

[18]      Leamed  counsel  also cites the case of Attomey  General  v Joseph  Marzocchi  and Anor SCA N08  of  1996,  in which  case  the  COUli of appeal  held,  that  the  doctrine  of res judicata   is based  on the rationale  that there  is a public  interest  in finality  of Courts' decisions   (interest   republicae   ut  finis  litium  sit)  and  that  individual   should  not  be troubled  twice on the same subject matter  (nemo debet vexari pro eadem  causa)

[19]    Therefore,  the essence  of the submissions  of leamed  counsel  for the Petitioner  is that for  a plea  of res judicata   to succeed,  there must be a final  and binding  decision  that emcompases  the same subject  matter,  on the same cause of action and the same parties. Having  considered   the case  law in mind that has developed  our jurisprudence   in this area oflaw,   I have  no good reason  to disagree  with the submissions  of learned  counsel for the Petitioner.  Infact, this is the current  legal position  based  on our Jurisprudence

[20]        Learned  Counsel  for the Petitioner  cites a plethora  of case law authorities  in which  the Court, in its interpretation   of Article  1351 ofthe  Civil Code of Seychelles  Act, has spelt out the "three  fold"  criteria  for a plea of res judicata  to succeed.  For example,  leamed Counsel  cites the case of Mathew  chanyumwai  VS Seychelles  Yatch Club CS220f2017 in which case, Pillay J had stated, that "for a plea of res judicata  to be upheld there must be  the  threefold   identity  of  subject  matter,  cause  and  parties  between  the  first  and second case. Perhaps  quite significant  to this current proceeding,  is the case ofNourrice Vs Assary  (1991)  SLR,  in which  case, the Supreme  Court made  the point  that where an earlier  application  is dismissed  for procedural  irregularity,   the plea of res judicata does not apply.

[21]      It is  the  submission   of  learned   counsel  for the  Petitioner,   that  the  principle   of res judicata  will operate  where  there has been a final determination   of the patties  dispute.
 
Learned  counsel relies on Clarisse V Sophola  [2005] CS96. Learned  counsel proceeded to add, that there  was never  a final determination   of the parties  matrimonial   property dispute  in M259/2020.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
[22]      I have read the submissions  of counsel  for both patties  in these proceedings,   argueing for and against  the plea  of res judicata.   I find the two submissions  to be fundamental different  when  it comes  to the interpretation   and application  of the law of res judicata to  the  facts  and  circumstances   of  this  case.  I am not  at  all  persuaded,   that  leamed counsel  for Respondent   is himself  convinced  that this petition  is barred  for being res judicata  and that explains  why he has taken a simplistic  approach  in his submissions  to argue the case that this petition  is res judicata.  I am equally not persuaded,  that had he been on the other side of the coin he would have accepted the very argument  which he has come up with in this case.

[23]    On the other  hand,  I find the submissions   of learned  counsel  for the Petitioner  to be very  correct  on  the  Law  of res judicata   as  well  as  its  application   to  the  facts  and circumstances   of the instant  case. For this reason,  I find no need to rehearse  the law on res judicata  which  has been  adequately  presented  and supported  by case law. Suffice to say, however,  that the current  petition  before  this Court is based  on procedural  law, in that,  it seeks  for an extension  of time under  rule 4 (1) of the Matrimonial   Causes Rules  to file  a petition  for a property  adjustment   order  or a division  of matrimonial property  order.

[24]      The  case  (MA25912020) arising  in DV11812019)  before  Pillay j was  a petition  for a property   adjustment   order  or  a division  of matrimonial   Property  order.  In that  case before  Pillay j  the merits  of the petition  or application  were  never  considered  in the light of the substantive  law because  the Petitioner  was foul of the procedure  by failing to seek for leave of the COUltto file the petition  proper for a property  adjustment  order or a division  of matrimonial  property  order out of time.
 
[25]       Therefore,    Pillay  j was  perfectly    COlTect to dismiss   the  petition.   However,   the  dismissal of  the  petition    cannot   render   the  current   petition    for  leave   to  refile   the  petition    for  a property    adjustment    order  or a division   of matrimonial    property   order  out  of time  to be res judicata    because    the  threefold    under   Article   1351  of  the  Civil   Code  of  Seychelles Act   are  not  made   out.   Furthermore,      there   has  been   no  finality    of  judgement     on  the
merits  ofthe   application    in [MA259/2020] (arising in DV118/19). The dispute between the  parties   over   the  matrimonial    property   at  issue   remains   live  without   a  final judgement    to  have  it  settled.  For  these  reasons,   therefore,   the  contention   that  this application  is res judicata  plea inlimine litis is overruled  and is accordingly  dismissed.

[26]      To determine  this application  for an extension  of time to file a petition  for a division  of matrimonial   property  on its merit,  I have  taken  into  account  the  fact that  as per the affidavit  evidence,  the decree nisi of  divorce  was made absolute  on the 30th June 2020. Clearly,  therefore,  the Applicant  is way  out of the prescriptive   period  of 2 months.  I note, however,  that as per paragraph  8 of the affidavit  in support of the application,  the Applicant  avers, that during the divorce process  a letter was written to Mr. Joel Camille, Attomey  for the Respondent,   to offer the Respondent   to purchase  her undivided  half right in the matrimonial   property  which  letter the Respondent  did not reply to.

[27]      I also note,  that  at paragraph   11 of its affidavit  in support  of the Application   for an extension  of time,  the Applicant   avers,  that  he failed  to apply  for a division  of their matrimonial  property  within  the time prescribed  by Law.

[28]      I am mindful  of the fact, that the question  of whether  on the facts and circumstances  of this case the delay should be condoned  has to be considered  within the background  that rules  of  COUli must  be  obeyed.  In Aglae  V  Attorney   General  SCA  N035  of 2010, [unreported]  the Iearned Chief Justice cited with approval the order of the Privy Council in Ratnam  V Cunnarasamy   [1964] All   ER 933,  state the following

"The Rules of Court must prima facie be obeyed an d in order tojustify a Court in extending the time during which some steps inprocedure require to be taken, there must be some material on which the Court can exercise its discretion. If the Law requires otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension  of time which  would  defeat  the purpose  of the rules which is to provide  a time table for  conduct  of litigation.  "

[29]    On account of the facts and circumstances of this cases, it is clear that by writing to counsel for the Respondent to offer the Respondent the opportunity to purchase his undivided half share of the matrimonial property, the Petitioner was attempting to resolve their matrimonial property issue amicably. Unfortunately, the Respondent did not reply to the offer.

[30]     Therefore, I am still of the view expressed in Rose Vs Richmond (MA97 of 2022) [2022] SCSC 15TH December 2022, that given that the light to property is a right afforded  to  us  all under Article  26  (1)  of the  Charter of Human Rights  in our constitution, in order to uphold the property right of both parties to this application, and in the interest of justice, the indulgence of this COUltis called for. Therefore, this application should be allowed for a determination of the patties' matrimonial property issues in order to come to a final settlement of their dispute. I therefore allow the application and grant the Petitioner  an extension of time of two weeks as of today to file  his  application for  a division  of matrimonial property between  him  and the Respondent.

 

Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 25th   November 2024.

 

▲ To the top