Constance v R (MA 259 of 2024 (Arising in MC 02 of 2024)) [2024] SCSC 198 (11 December 2024)

Constance v R (MA 259 of 2024 (Arising in MC 02 of 2024)) [2024] SCSC 198 (11 December 2024)

GOVINDEN CJ


[1]        The  Applicant  has  applied  for  an order  staying  the  execution  of  the judgment  of the Supreme   Court   delivered   on  the   26tb    September   2024,   pending   the  hearing   and determination  of the appeal. This COUlthas ordered that a writ habere facias possessionem be issued  against  the Respondent,  who  is the Applicant,  and that the possession  of title H14683 be restored  to the Petitioner,  who is now the Respondent,  the Attorney  General representing  the Ministry  of Land Use and Housing.


[2]        The  Application   is  brought  on  the  grounds  of  existence  of  an Appeal  with  a strong likelihood   of  success;   irreparable   harm;  balance   of  convenience;   and  urgency.  The Application  is supported by an Affidavit.
 

[3]         The  Applicant   states  that  the primary   grounds  of appeal  include:  the failure  of the  Supreme Court  to grant  a fair hearing,   contrary   to Constitutional    right;  erroneous   issuance   of a writ habere facias  possessi.onem  despite  the existence  of contentious  factual  and legal issues that warranted a full oral hearing; and that ruling is based on misinterpretations  of statutory provisions  regarding  the Attorney-General's   authority and involvement  in civil matters.


[4]        During the Court proceedings  on the 28th  November  2024, the Counsel for the Applicant, submitted that authority  given to Mr Guy Ferley by the Attorney General to represent  the Respondent  in court  was defective  in law. It was submitted  that while the court  made a ruling  that  the  application   was  defective  it also  gave  the  applicant,  now  Respondent, another opportunity  to get a proper  authority.  Counsel  submits that the COUl1of Appeal will have to decide whether it was proper to give the respondent  a second bite at the cherry, Counsel  relied  on decision  of Lesperance  v Ernestine  & Anar  (SCA  15 of 2020)  [2023] SCCA 14 (26 ApI;1 2023). In that case counsel was supposed to file submissions,  but had not done so. The court  gave another opportunity  to file the submissions  and counsel  did not file it again. The judge decided to do her own research and gave the judgment  based on the said research.  The Court  of Appeal  held that it was not proper  and retumed  the case back to the Supreme  Court,


[5]       Counsel  for  the  Applicant   further  submitted  that  an  appeal  does  not  act  as  a stay  of execution; that the court has equitable powers  conferred by section 6 of the COUl1sAct to grant a stay of execution  as an equitable  remedy  and this can be done only if justice  so requires,  in a particular  case, when no sufficient  legal remedy  is provided  by any statute for the judgment  debtor\appellant  to obtain this protection of a stay pending appeal (Avalon (pry) Ltd & Drs v Berlouis  (CS 150/2001) [2003] SCSC 20 (8 September 2003)).


[6]        Counsel further referred  to McDonald  Pool versus Despi.ly William 1996 SLR 192 which held that  there  are five grounds  that  would justify  a stay of execution:  (1) Whether  an appellant would suffer loss which could not be compensated  in damages; (2) where special circumstances  of the case  are required;  (3) if there is proof  of substantial  loss that may otherwise  result;  (4) if there  is substantial  question  of law to be adjudicated  upon at the hearing of the appeal; and (5) if the appeal would otherwise be rendered nugatory.  It was submitted that the Application  is based on grounds  1,4 and 5.
 

[7]       With regards  to first ground,  the Applicant  in the Affidavit  stated that that he will suffer irreparable  hann  and damage  and he will be dispossessed  of the business  and livelihood, causing    significant    personal    and   financial    hardship,    without    the   possibility    of compensation  should the appeal succeed.  Further, that it will be impossible  to reverse  the consequences   if the  appeal  is successful,  as it may not be possible  to recommence  the business  or be compensated  for the damage caused during the execution  of the writ. The Applicant  further stated in the affidavit  that the balance of convenience  lies in favour of granting a stay of execution  as the Respondent  will not suffer any substantial  prejudice  as the status quo will be maintained  pending  the outcome of the appeal. On the other hand, the Applicant   faces  the  risk  of  irreversible   loss  and  financial  ruin  if  the judgment   is executed prior to the determination  of the appeal.


[8]       Denis Barbe in the Affidavit  in reply stated the following with regards to the irreparable harm and balance of convenience  grounds.  He has personal knowledge  that the Applicant is  operating  many  other  kiosks,  mainly  on  Govemment   lands,  for  example  at Roche Caiman  Eden Village,  Roche Caiman  opposite  Fresh Cut butcher's  shop, Perseverance  1 and  on  land  belonging  to  himself  at Cote  D'  Or, Praslin.  Denis  Barbe  states  that  the Applicant makes these averments in bad faith, knowing that he is a very successful businessman.


[9]    It is also averred that the balance of convenience  should not be a deciding factor in deciding whether  a stay  should  be  granted  or not.  Denis  Barbe states  that,  on  the contrary,  the Respondent  will suffer serious prejudice  if the stay is granted for the following reasons:

"(a) the Applicant,   by refusing  to remove  his kiosk  is obstructing  the completion  of the project.

(b) the contractor  Laxmanbhai   Company Limited  which is doing the project,  by way of a donation,  needs  to complete  the project  urgently as it needs to deploy  to other projects it is undertaking.

(c)  Government   needs  to  have  all  the kiosks  completed  to allocate  to the  other  small businessmen  and businesswomen  some of which vacated the site of the project  to allow the construction  to be done. "


[10]      It is further stated in the Affidavit  in Reply that Denis Barbe have been  advised that the primary  consideration  as to whether  a stay should be granted or not is whether there is a substantial  issue of law or fact which  requires  determination  by the court;  and that the affidavit of the Applicant  does not reveal that there is such a question.
 

[11]      Counsel  for the Applicant  further referred  to Chang-Tave  v Chang-Tave  (CS  153/2002) [2003] SCSC 7 (6 March  2003)  and Avalon  (Fry)  Ltd  & aI's v Berlouis  (CS  150/2001) [2003]  SCSC 20  (8 September  2003)  and submitted  that what  is not clear, whether  an applicant have to prove all of grounds that would justify  a stay of execution or one of them will suffice or two of them will suffice.  It was submitted  that if the applicant  can satisfy the cOUl1on one of these considerations,  then the cOUl1should grant a stay. Counsel further referred  to Elmasry  & Anor v!-iua Sun (SCA 28 of 20 19) [2020] SCCA 2 (23 June 2020) and submitted that the sixth ground was added by the Court of Appeal.


[12]    The relevant paragraph  of the judgement  states:

"[14] The circumstances  a court would consider in granting  a stay of execution have been stated as follows   in earlier Seychelles  authorities:

(i)        Where there is a substantial  question  of law to be adjudicated  upon at the hearing  of the appeal,

(ii)         Where special circumstances  so require,

(iii)        Where there is proof  of substantial  loss that may otherwise result,

(iv)        Where ifthe stay is not granted the appeal !(successful, would be rendered nugatory,

(v)         If a  stay  is granted,  and  the  appeal fails,   what  are  the  risks  that  the respondent  will be unable to enforce  the judgment,

(vi)      If a stay is refused, and the appeal succeeds,  and the judgment  is enforced in  the  meantime,   what  are  the  risks  of  the  appellant   being  unable  to recover the subject matter of execution (in a money judgment  that has been paid  to the respondent)?  "


[13]     Applicant's  Counsel  submitted that present case does not concem money judgment  but the principle  applies.  If the appellant  succeeds  and the judgment  has been executed there are no chances that the appellant would be able to recover its business at Beau Vallon. Counsel further cited paragraph  16 of Elmasry  judgment:

"[16] The sine qua non or the most important  element that needs to be satisfied  in seeking a  Stay  is  to  aver  in  the  application   and  satisfy   the  Court prima  facie   that  there  are substantial  questions  of law and facts  to be adjudicated  upon at the hearing of the appeal. Merely  stating  that the applicants  have an arguable  case and the appeal filed  has some prospect  of success,  is not sufficient.  The affidavitfiled   in this case does not state why the Applicants  believe  that they have an arguable  case or has some prospect  of success.  An appeal  arises from   a trial  that  has already  taken place  and  a judgment   that  has been delivered  by the original  Trial Court. In a civil case the Trial Court decides  the case on the basis of the pleadings,  the issues, and the evidence both oral and documentary  that had been led before  the  Court. An  appeal  shall succeed  before an appellate  court where  the Trial  Court had erred  in law  or facts   in rendering  its judgment   and not on the issue of prejudice   that will be caused  to either party.  Undoubtedly  in any proceedings before  a court  one party  succeeds  and the otherfails   unless a consent judgment  has been entered into.  Issues  such  as prejudice   to parties   and  the  balance  of convenience   come  in for consideration  only where the Court hearing  a Stay of Execution  application  is prima facie satisfied  that there are substantial  questions  of law andfacts  to be adjudicated  upon at the hearing  of the appeal,  that the applicant  has an arguable  case  and the appeal filed  has some prospect  of success.  This necessitates  that the Notice of Appeal filed should  in stating the grounds  of appeal,  at its bare  minimum  disclose  the questions  of law andfacts   upon which  the  Trial Judge  erred  and  thus  has to be adjudicated  upon  at the hearing  of the appeal.  This does not mean  that there needs  to be an elaborate  discussion  of the law or facts.  In the Sri Lankan  case of KAR UNASEKERA  v REV  CHANDANANDA  (2004) 2 Sri L.R it was stated:  "The court  is not expected  to go into the intricacies  of the question  of law to be decided  in the appeal:  it is sufficient  if the court is satisfied  that it prima facie appears  that there is a substantial  question  of law to be decided in the appeal. " It is only then   that  the  prejudice    to  the  applicant   and  or  respondent   becomes   relevant  for consideration.  If the Applicant fails at this hurdle, in my view, the rest of the grounds  that are considered  in granting  a Stay  need  not be looked  into.  There  is no averment  in the application for  Stay that there are substantial  questions of law and facts  to be adjudicated upon. "


[14]     The Counsel  further emphasised  that at this stage  "The court is not expected to go into the intricacies  of the question of law to be decided in the appeal".


[15]       It was submitted that the first ground of appeal addresses a point of law -whether  the cOUl1 should have dismissed the case outright  when it made a finding that the authority given to Mr. Ferley  by  the Attorney  General  bye-mail    was defective  and not  sufficient  in law. Ground 2 is that the cOUl1erred in law when it ruled that the constitutional  mandate of the Attorney  General is conferred in the Article 76 of the Constitution in respect of civil matters
is not provided  for under the Constitution,  and is rather a creature of Section 29( 1) of the Seychelles  Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently,  the court erred when it refused to refer the matter to the Constitutional  Court by way of referral.


[16]     Thirdly,  it was  submitted  that the Iearned  Chief Justice erred  in law when he ruled that since Section  29(1) provides  that any suit brought  against the Government  of Seychelles has  to be in the name  of the Attorney  General,  the Attorney  General  can either  appear personally  or appear through one of his subordinate  officers or through an attorney at law in private practice.


[17]     Grounds  four and five directly relates to the ruling of 26th  September.  Ground four states the learned Chief Justice erred in law when he proceeded to give judgment  on the pleadings only instead  of ordering  a hearing  on the merits  of the case since the parties  had raised several  contentious  factual  and  legal  issues  which  could  only  have  been  decided  after proper  oral  hearing   and by tendering   of exhibits   in court,  It was submitted that the applicant therefore has been deprived of his constitutional  right to a fair hearing.


[18]      Finally, it was submitted  that the leamed Chief Justice erred in law when he ordered a writ habere facias possessionem  to be issued against the appellant since the appellant has raised a reasonable  and serious defense. Counsel  further submitted  that those grounds of appeal are not frivolous and vexatious; that they are substantial  grounds for appeal based on law. Counsel  further argued that it is imperative  that the COUliof Appeal has an opportunity to make a decision  on those points of law because this is a novel case. Counsel stated that he has never  come  across  a case  where  the Attorney  General  gave an Attomey  in private practice the authority to represent the Government  of Seychelles. Therefore,  it was argued that  it  is  a  novel  point  that  needs  to  be  decided  by  the  COUli of  Appeal  whether determination  by the trial court was correct  or there was an enol'. Further, Counsel stated that the Attomey  General himself would benefit  from such a judgment  from the COUliof Appeal, which would establish whether the Attomey General can delegate the power given to him.


[19]        Counsel  for  the  Respondent   in  reply  also  cited  paragraph   16  of  Elmasry  judgment, submitting that the directions were quite clear and it is that the most important element that needs  to be satisfied  in seeking  a stay is to  satisfy  the court prima facie  that there  are substantial  questions  of law and fact to be adjudicated  upon.  Respondent  submitted  that there  is  no  question   of  law  to  be  decided.   Counsel   submitted  that  the  Applicant's submission  on  law  that  it is not permissible   for  the  Attorney  General  to  delegate  his function to a private  attorney is not correct  at. It was submitted  that the Attomey General has such powers. Counsel referred to criminal cases as an example, where section 63 of the Criminal Procedure Code clearly states that the Attorney  General by writing under his hand may appoint any advocate of the Supreme Court or person employed  in the public service, not being  a police  officer,  being  the rank  of Sergeant,  to be a public  prosecutor  for the purpose  of any case. Counsel further referred to section 64 stating that a public prosecutor may appear and plead without any written authority before any COUltin which any case of which he has been  charged,  he's  under  inquiry  trial or appeal  and if any private  person instructs  advocate  to prosecute  in any such case, the public  prosecutor  may conduct the prosecution   and  the  advocate   so  instructed   shall  act  therein  under  those  directions. Therefore, Counsel  submitted that the Attomey  General has powers to delegate in criminal matters   and  he  has  powers   to delegate   in  civil  matters.   Counsel   submitted    that  the  main issue   to  be   decided    before    this   Court    is   whether    the   Applicant     in  this   matter   has demonstrated    that  there  is a substantial   issue  of law  to be tried.  It was  submitted   that  there is no  such  question   to be tried  and therefore,   in accordance   with  the  Elsmary  judgment,    the matter   should  end  here.  Counsel   further  submitted   that  the  learned  Chief  Justice  dealt  with this  matter   succinctly;    and  delegating   powers   of the  Attorney   General   is permissible;    it is also  permissible    under   the  Criminal   Procedure    Code.  Counsel   further   submitted    that  the Constitution     also  doesn't    state  that  the  Attorney    General   shall  be  the  sole  advisor   to  the Government,    it  says  that  the  Attomey    General   shall  be  the  principal   legal  adviser   to  the Government,     not  the  sole;   and  it  is  not  exclusive.    The   wording    of  the  Constitution     is inclusive.

 

Determination
[20]      In determining  this application, based on the authority of Elmas}J! & Anal' v Hua Sun (SCA 28 of 2019)  [2020] SCCA 2 (23 June 2020) and others, this Court must evaluate whether there is substantial  question of law to be adjudicated  upon at the hearing of the appeal.


[21]      I have  scrutinized  my  decision  in  the  light  of  the  Notice  of  Motion,  the  Reply,  and submissions  made. Upon analysis of the grounds of appeal as presented  by the Applicant, I find that there is no substantial  question of law to be adjudicated  upon at the hearing of the appeal for the following reasons.


[22]        It is evident that the Applicant has not presented  any grounds of appeal that shows that he has any likelihood of success on appeal.


[23]      With regards  to the defective  authority  of Mr Ferley to represent  the Attorney  General, I made it clear that it did not nullify the proceedings  and that an authority proper in form can be granted.  The authority  being granted by the Attorney  General,  the Court proceeded  to accept it and the case proceeded  on this basis.  I note that no attempt has been made by the Applicant  to appeal against what amounts to an interlocutory  ruling within this proceeding and when  the court  granted  to Mr Ferley  time to bring proper  mandate  to the court, no significant protest was made by Mr Elizabeth.


[24]     The second  ground  of appeal has no reasonable  chance of success  as the capacity to act and legal mandate  of the Attorney General in civil matters is derived from the Civil Code as  compared    to  the  Constitution.    The  Attorney   General   is a creature   of  the  Constitution, however,   his  legal  authority   to  act  in a civil  capacity   is  conferred   by  an Act.  Whilst   the Constitution     has  set  out  his  Constitutional     and  Criminal    law  competence,    his  civil   law competence    is provided   in the  Seychelles   Code  of Civil  Procedure.   Hence,  prima facie  no Constitutional  cause of action arose and the motion for referral to the Constitutional  Court was rightly held to be frivolous and vexatious.


[25]     The third ground relates to the application of Section 29( 1) of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure.  There  is nothing  in that provision  which  prevents  the Attorney  General  from deciding who he instructs  to bring the case to court. The only legal duty cast upon him is that the Action has to be brought in the name of the Attorney  General if it a civil action for or against the Govemment.   I do not find any reasonable  ground of success here. There is no controversial  and substantial point of law to be determined by the Apex court.


[26]      Ground  4 is out rightly  erroneous.  Matters  such  as writ  habere facias  posessionem   are decided on the pleadings  filed by both parties. In this case the court was satisfied that there was sufficient facts before it that would enable it to come to a proper and just determination of the case. Moreover,  neither  the Applicant's  Counsel  nor that of the Respondent  made any attempts  to ask this cOUlito use its discretion  to call for oral evidence on matters that they felt needed  further evidence  in support. Both patties  did not object to the case being decided based on the facts submitted in the pleadings and were seemingly satisfied that the case be decided on documents  submitted to the COUlt.


[27]     The fifth ground  also presents  little chance  of success.  The Respondent,  now Applicant, failed to present  a valid defence in reply to the Petition,  as he had no lawful title, his title was defective as he allegedly acquired possession  from a person who was not the owner of the impugned  parcel.  Moreover,  he was informed by the Government,  the rightful owner, of the basis of the invalidity  of his claim to lawful possession.


[28]    Having come to the above conclusion, that there is no reasonable  chance of success in the appeal, the issue of irreparable  harm to the Applicant  does not arise; and cannot arise in this case as there would be no loss pending appeal; or even after the appeal. To the contrary, the loss would be on the part of the Respondent,  which is carrying  out a development  in the public  interest on the Beau Vallon beach front, a project which has been curtailed as a result of this action.
 

[29]    Accordingly,  this application  for stay of execution  of the Court's  judgment  delivered on the 26th   September  2024 is dismissed  with cost in favour of the Respondent.

 

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