Court name
Constitutional Court
Case number
CP 11 of 2014
Counsel for plantiff
A. Amesbry
Morel v National Drugs Enforcement Agency & Ano. (CP 11 of 2014) [2017] SCCC 2 (16 March 2017);
Media neutral citation
[2017] SCCC 2
Counsel for defendant
A. Madelein
Dodin, J
Robinson, J
Akiiki-Kiiza, J
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SEYCHELLES
[Corum: DODIN, ROBINSON, AKIIKI-KIIZA, JJ]
CP11/2014
[2017] SCCC 2
ANTHONY MOREL
Petitioner
versus
NATIONAL DRUGS ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
First Respondent
ATTORNEY GENERAL Representing the Government of Seychelles
Second Respondent
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Third Respondent
Heard: 11 October 2016
Counsel: A. Amesbury for petitioner
A. Madeleine for respondents
Delivered: 16 March 2017
JUDGMENT
G. Dodin, J (D. Akiiki-Kiiza, J concurring)
[1] The Petitioner was arrested on the 1st day of August, 2013 and subsequently charged with one count of importation of a controlled drug and one count of trafficking in a controlled drug. He was held on remand in custody pending trial. The trial concluded on the 16th September, 2014 when the Court ruled that the Petitioner, then accused, had no case to answer and he was acquitted of all charges.
[2] The Petitioner now in this Petition contends that since he was acquitted on a ruling of no case to answer due to lack of evidence to establish aprima facie case against him, his arrest and continued detention were therefore unlawful and a contravention of Article 18(10) of the Constitution.
[3] The Petitioner prays for compensation in the total sum of SCR 12,159,500 being SCR 11,600,000 for unlawful arrest and detention, deprivation of liberty and enjoyment of life and family life; SCR 181,500 and continuing at SCR 11,900 per month for loss of earnings from the 1st August, 2013 until he secures alternative employment; SCR 88,000 for loss of compensation; and SCR 290,000 for loss of reputation and stigma of being seen as a drug dealer.
[4] Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that Article 18 (10) of the Constitution stipulates that “A person who has been unlawfully arrested or detained has a right to receive compensation from the person who unlawfully arrested or detained that person or from any other person or authority, including the state, on whose behalf or in the course of whose employment the unlawful arrest or detention was made or from both of them”.On the facts and circumstances of this case the Court is being asked to determine whether the Petitioner’s initial arrestand continued detention by the Respondents was lawful and whether the acts of the Respondent entitles him to compensation under Article 18 (10).
[5] Learned counsel submitted that save for the provision of Article 18 (7) of the Constitution which says that“a person who is produced before a Court shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions forappearance at a later date for trial….”, there are no other substantive or procedural provision in regards to bail for an accused person.
[6] Learned counsel submitted that whilst Section 101 (1) to (10) of the Criminal Procedure Code extensively lays down the legal procedure to be followed in regards to the granting of bail for a suspect (at pre-trial stage) and Section 342 of the same Code makes procedural provisions for bail pending appeal for a Convict, the law is silent in regards to bail for an accused person, save for the limited provisions contained in Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code where the question of bail of an accused person is left entirely to the mercy of the Court and the discretion of the presiding Judge.
[7] Learned counsel submitted that in the absence of any specific provision for bail of an accused person, one must, as a matter of necessity, rely upon Section 101 of the Criminal Procedure Code, taken together with Article 18 (7) of the Constitution which is a repetition of Section 101 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[8] Learned counsel submitted that section 101 (7) is the only piece of legislation which provides for the “extension of remand”. If the Court is to extend remand, then it cannot do so in isolation of the concomitant provisions of Section 101 (7) which also provides that “the Court shall not grant an extension unless, having regard to the circumstances specified in sub-section (5), the Court determines that it is necessary to grant the extension.”
[9] Learned counsel maintained that section 101 (7) places a burden upon the Respondent to satisfy the Court that there has been no change in the circumstances of the case thereby justifying the extension of remand sought. If the Respondent cannot discharge that burden to the satisfaction of the Court, again, section 101 (7) is clear and unambiguous in that it provides that:“… the Court shall not grant an extension unless, having regard to the circumstances specified in sub-section (5), the Court determines that it is necessary to grant the extension.”
[10] Learned counsel submitted that furthermore, the “circumstances” referred to in Section 101 (7) and as are found at Section 101 (5) all relate to the circumstances of the case and not the personal circumstances of the accused persons. Learned counsel submitted that in the Judge’s ruling, the reasons advanced for the denial of bail are that the offences charged are of a serious nature. Secondly that there is ‘some material by way of affidavit to implicate the applicant in the offences alleged to have been committed and thirdly “there is strong likelihood of the Applicant failing to appear for the hearing of this case or otherwise obstructing the course of justice if he is remanded to bail”. And this, despite the fact that out of a 23 paragraph affidavit in support of remand dated the 13th August 2013 relied upon by the Respondents there is only a brief mention of the Petitioner in paragraph 18 which stated that “the driver of the van spoke to Erick Muriuki Njgue.” Then “the driver remained in the van.”
[11] Learned counsel submitted that then in paragraph 19 the Petitioner is mentioned by name, was searched and nothing incriminating was found in the van or on his person, and he stated that he had come to pick up a girl whose name and telephone number he did not possess. This being the totality of the evidence against him, and sworn to by the Respondent. There is not even a prima facie case against the Petitioner that would justify his arrest and/or his detention for 13 and half months, if the applicable standard for determining whether his arrest and detention was in “accordance with fair procedures established by law.”
[12] Learned counsel submitted that the Constitution as the Supreme Law dictates that any procedures and or law that is not in accordance with it, is null and void and since neither the Penal Code nor the Misuse of Drugs Act contain an offence called “being in the right place at the wrong time” there was insufficient evidence even on a prima facie to arrest, charge and detain the Petitioner for 13 and half months and having done so the Respondents are liable under Article 18 (10) of the Constitution to compensate the Petitioner in the terms prayed for.
[13] Learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that Petitioner’s arrest on 1st August 2013, detention at the BeauVallon Police Station upon the order of the Magistrate’s Court following his production before the same Magistrate’s Court from the 2nd August 2013 until 14th August 2013 and his detention at the Mont Posee Prison upon the order of the Supreme Court following his formal charge before the Supreme Court on 14th August 2013 until 16th September 2014 were lawful and in accordance with fair procedures established by law as prescribed under article 18(2)(b) and 18(7)(b) and (c) of the Constitution and sections 18(a), 101(5)(b) and 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[14] Learned counsel submitted that Article 18(1) of the Constitution provides for payment of compensation to a person who has been unlawfully arrested and detained. Damages under the said Article 18(1) of the Constitution are awarded for the constitutional hurt suffered by the person as a result of his unlawful arrest and detention.
[15] Learned counsel submitted that the Petitioner did not suffer constitutional hurt neither by reason of his arrest on 1st August 2013 nor by his subsequent detention fortnightly after 2nd August 2013 until 16th September 20014 when he was acquitted by the Supreme Court upon successful submission of no case to answer because there was reasonable and probable cause of his arrest, detention and prosecution, hence he is not entitled to compensation or damages under Article 18(10) of the Constitution.
[16] Learned counsel submitted that the Petitioner’s arrest and detention by the agents of the 1st Respondent on 1st August 2013 was on reasonable suspicion of him having committed the offences of trafficking in a controlled drugs and conspiracy to traffic in a controlled drug, together with one Eric MuruikiNjue who had himself been arrested on 31st July 2013 on reasonable suspicion of having committed the offence on importation of a controlled drug. The Petitioner’s arrest was for the purposes of investigation and of producing him, if necessary, before Court in accordance with section 18(a) and 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[17] Learned counsel submitted that within twenty-four hours of his arrest and detention, on 2nd August 2013, in accordance with the fair procedures established under Article 18(5) of the Constitution read with section 100(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Petitioner together with Eric Edward Muruiki Njue were produced before the Magistrate Court.Pursuant to an application by agents of the 1st Respondent for further holding of the Petitioner the learned Magistrate determined that the Petitioner together with Eric Muruiki Njue should be remanded in custody at the Beau-Vallon Police Station until 14thAugust 2014. This was consistent with Article 18(7) of the Constitution as read with Section 101 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[18] Learned counsel submitted that on the 14th August 2014, the Petitioner was formally charged before the Supreme Court together with the said Eric Edward MuruikiNjue on two counts in criminal case CR 46/2013 for the offences of trafficking in a controlled drug and conspiracy to traffic in a controlled drug and was remanded in custody at the Montagne Posee Prison pursuant to an application by the state counsel representing the 2nd Respondent under section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Article 18(7) of the Constitution.The remand of the Petitioner was following his formal charge.
[19] Learned counsel submitted that at the time, the 2nd Respondent had reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution of the Petitioner in that it acted in the “honest belief of the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon a reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances as made out in paragraphs 4 to 20 of the affidavit in support which assuming them to be true,would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious person to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed.
[20] Learned counsel maintained that from the 14th August 2013 until the 16th September 2014, following fortnightly applications by the State Counsel representing the 2nd Respondent, the Petitioner was remanded into custody at the Mont Posee Prison. On the 16th September 2014, the Petitioner was acquitted by the Supreme Court following a successful submission of no case to answer made on his behalf.During the periods of pre-trial detention and detention during trial, the Petitioner made applications to the Supreme Court to be released on bail and upon hearing the bail applications, the Supreme Court refused bail.
[21] Learned counsel submitted that in refusing bail, the Supreme Court acted judiciously in finding that the charge was of a serious nature, there was material by way of affidavit evidence implicating the Petitioner in the offences which he was alleged to have committed and sufficient material to suggest that if remanded to bail the applicant will not avail himself to trial or would otherwise obstruct the course of justice.
[22] Learned counsel submitted that the subsequent acquittal of the Petitioner on 16th September 2014 was on the ground that there was insufficient evidence led by the Prosecution at the trial to support a prima face case against the Petitioner.
[23] Learned counsel concluded that the Petitioner’s arrest and detention was fair and legal and did not constitute an infringement of his right to liberty as the acts of the 1st and 2nd respondents were consistent with the Seychellois Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms.No damages are payable to the Petitioner on account of his dismissal from his employment with the Seychelles Bureau of Standards was on account of his failure to report on duty 27th August 2013 and failing to inform the organization as to the reasons for not reporting for duty. No damages are payable to the Petitioner on account of not seeing his children during the 13 ½ months of detention as he was not denied the opportunity of seeing them.
[24] Learned Counsel submitted that alternatively, that if the Court finds that damages are due to the Petitioner,the damages claimed by the Petitioner are manifestly harsh and excessive in all circumstances consideration of the alleged contravention of the charter (which is not admitted).
[25] Learned counsel hence moved the Court to dismiss the Petition.
[26] It is evident that any decision regarding whether or not compensation ought to be paid would depend on whether this Court is satisfied that the arrest, detention and continued detention of the Petitioner in the criminal case was unlawful and a contravention of the relevant Article of the Constitution, namely Article 18.
[27] Article 18 of the Constitution states:
(1) Every person has a right to liberty and security of the person.
(2) The restriction, in accordance with fair procedures established by law, of the right under clause (1) in the following cases shall not be treated as an infringement of clause (1)-
(a) the arrest or detention in execution of a sentence or other lawful order of a court;
(b) the arrest or detention on reasonable suspicion of having committed or of being about to commit an offence for the purposes of investigation or preventing the commission of the offence and of producing, if necessary, the offender before a competent court;
(c) the arrest or detention to prevent the spread of infectious or contagious diseases which constitute a serious threat to public health;
(d) the arrest or detention for the treatment and rehabilitation of a person who is, or reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind or addicted to drugs to prevent harm to that person or to the community;
(e) the arrest or detention for the purpose of preventing the unauthorised entry into Seychelles of a person, not being a citizen of Seychelles, or for the purpose of deportation or extradition of that person;
(f) the detention for the rehabilitation and welfare of a minor with the consent of the parent or guardian or of the Attorney-General where such detention is ordered by a competent court.
(3) A person who is arrested or detained has a right to be informed at the time of the arrest or detention or as soon as is reasonably practicable thereafter in, as far as is practicable, a language that the person understands of the reason for the arrest or detention, a right to remain silent, a right to be defended by a legal practitioner of the person’s choice and, in the case of a minor, a right to communicate with the parent or guardian.
(4) A person who is arrested or detained shall be informed at the time of the arrest or detention or as soon as is reasonably practicable thereafter of the rights under clause (3).
(5) A person who is arrested or detained, if not released, shall be produced before a court within twenty-four hours of the arrest or detention or, having regard to the distance from the place of arrest or detention to the nearest court or the non-availability of a judge or magistrate, or force majeure, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the arrest or detention.
(6) A person charged with an offence has a right to be tried within a reasonable time.
(7) A person who is produced before a court shall be released, either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, for appearance at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to a trial except where the court, having regard to the following circumstances, determines otherwise-
(a) where the court is a magistrates’ court, the offence is one of treason or murder;
(b) the seriousness of the offence;
(c) there are substantial grounds for believing that the suspect will fail to appear for the trial or will interfere with the witnesses or will otherwise obstruct the course of justice or will commit an offence while on release;
(d) there is a necessity to keep the suspect in custody for the suspect’s protection or where the suspect is a minor, for the minor’s own welfare;
(e) the suspect is serving a custodial sentence;
(f) the suspect has been arrested pursuant to a previous breach of the conditions of release for the same offence.
(8) A person who is detained has the right to take proceedings before the Supreme Court in order that the Court may decide on the lawfulness of the detention and order the release of the person if the detention is not lawful.
(9) Proceedings under clause (8) shall be dealt with as a matter of urgency by the Supreme Court and shall take priority over the proceedings of the Court listed for hearing on that day.
(10) A person who has been unlawfully arrested or detained has a right to receive compensation from the person who unlawfully arrested or detained that person or from any other person or authority, including the State, on whose behalf or in the course of whose employment the unlawful arrest or detention was made or from both of them.
(11) A person who has not been convicted of an offence, if kept or confined in a prison or place of detention, shall not be treated as a convicted person and shall be kept away from any convicted person.
(12) An offender or a suspect who is a minor and who is kept in lawful custody or detention shall be kept separately from any adult offender or suspect.
(13) A female offender or suspect who is kept in lawful custody or detention shall be kept separately from any male offender or suspect.
(14) Where a person is convicted of any offence, any period which the person has spent in custody in respect of the offence shall be taken into account by the court in imposing any sentence of imprisonment for the offence.
(15) A person shall not be imprisoned merely on the ground of the inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
(16) Clause (15) shall not limit the powers of a court under any law in enforcing its orders.
[28] The operating requirement for a person to have recourse to Article 18(10) is that the person must have been“unlawfully arrested or detained”.Article 18(8) provides the procedures by which a detention can be determined to be unlawful by the Supreme Court. “A person who is detained has the right to take proceedings before the Supreme Court in order that the Court may decide on the lawfulness of the detention and order the release of the person if the detention is not lawful.” Learned counsel for the Petitioner seems to be arguing that it is the fact that the Petitioner was acquitted on a submission of no case to answer which automatically and retrospectively makes the arrest and detention unlawful. This cannot be the case as Article 10(8) makes obvious that it not up to the Petitioner to determine that his arrest and /or detention were unlawful by reason of his acquittal.
[29] Indeed, it is obvious from the pleadings and the respective submissions of the parties that the applications for remand made before the Magistrate’s Court and the Supreme Court were granted and the applications for bail made at pre-trial and during the trial were rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no claim or imputation of irregularity or impropriety by the arresting officers or the Courts in their determinations.
[30] Furthermore, there is no provision giving the Constitutional Court the power to determine whether an arrest of an accused person by lawfully authorised officers of the law or continued detention of an accused person by order of the Supreme Court or Magistrate’s Court is unlawful.That determination must come from the Supreme Court as per Article 18(8). The Constitutional Court cannot assume that the arrest and/or detention were unlawful by reason of the acquittal of the Petitioner by the trial Court. There must first be a finding that the arrest and/or detention of the Petitioner were unlawful in line with Article 18(8).
[31] In fact, learned counsel for the Petitioner recognises that there must be such determination of unlawful arrest and/or unlawful detention as stated in her submission at the 2nd Paragraph;
“On the facts and circumstances of this case the Court is being asked to determine whether the Petitioner’s initial arrest and continued detention by the Respondents was lawful and whether the acts of the Respondent entitles him to compensation under Article 18 (10).”
[32] Admittedly, if there had been a finding by the Supreme Court that the arrest and/or detention of the Petitioner were unlawful, the Constitutional Court could have been petitioned to determine whether the right to compensation of the Petitioner under Article 18(10) has been violated if such compensation has not been forthcoming after such a finding. However, the Constitutional Court cannot determine “whether the Petitioner’s initial arrest and continued detention by the Respondents was lawful”.
[33] I note en passant but I do not make any finding thereon, that from our consideration of the pleadings, noting the agreed facts of the case as it proceeded before the Magistrate’s Court and the Supreme Court, until the ruling on the submission of no case to answer in favour of the Petitioner, all normal and lawful procedures set out by the Criminal Procedure Code and the Constitution appeared to have been adhered to by the arresting officers, the prosecution and the Courts and no successful challenge was ever made before the Supreme Court regarding the adopted procedures.
[34] Consequently,Ifind that there is to date no declaration by the Supreme Court on the lawfulness of the arrest and/or detention of the Petitioner.I also find that the Constitutional Court is not the proper Court to determine whether the arrest and/or detention of the Petitioner were unlawful. I further find that the fact that the Petitioner was acquitted on a successful submission of no case to answer does not render the arrest and detention of the Petitioner unlawful per se.
[35] I therefore find that this Petition is not properly grounded and as it stands, it lacks merit. Consequently, I am satisfied that there is no basis for payment of compensation under Article 18(10) of the Constitution.
[36] This Petition is therefore dismissed accordingly.
[37] I make no order for cost.
Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 16 March, 2017.
G. Dodin
Judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding)
D. Akiiki-Kiiza, J
[1] I have had occasion to read the draft Judgment of my brother Justice Dodin. I generally agree with his Judgment and reasons advanced therein. I therefore concur with the Judgment and orders he has made.
[2] Order accordingly.
Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 16 March, 2017.
D. Akiiki-Kiiza
Judge of the Supreme Court
F. Robinson, J
[1] Petitioner brings a Constitutional Petition alleging that he was unlawfully arrested and detained and has a right under Article 18 (10), of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, to claim compensation from the persons who unlawfully arrested or detained him. Petitioner claims compensation from the National Drugs Enforcement Agency, First Respondent, the Attorney General representing the Government of Seychelles, Second Respondent and the Attorney General, Third Respondent. Respondents deny the claim of Petitioner. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment (in draft) of Dodin, J in this Constitutional case. For the sake of brevity, I adopt herein the facts of the case and the written submissions of counsel, which are read as part of this judgment.
[2] Petitioner exhibits a certified copy of the Ruling in CO46/2013, as exhibit AM1 (the "Ruling"). In the Ruling, which is dated 25 September, 2014, Mckee, J ruled that ―
″I find that there is insufficient evidence to support a prima facie case against the Accused. I uphold the No Case to Answer submission by the Defence. I find the Accused, Anthony Eugene Morel, Not Guilty and Acquit him of both charges against him, namely trafficking in a controlled drug of Class A and Conspiracy to traffic in a controlled drug of Class A.″.
[3] In the main, Petitioner contends that because he was acquitted on a Ruling of no case to answer, it is proof that he was the victim of an unlawful arrest and detention, and he is entitled to be compensated, by First and Second Respondents, according to law. Respondents rely on Article 18 (2) (b), 18 (7) (c) and 18 (10) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles and sections 18 (a), 101 (5) (b), 105 (5) (c) and 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code in support of their common position that there has not been a contravention or risk of contravention of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.
[4] In light of the above, the following issue is framed ―
whether the evidence that Petitioner was acquitted on a Ruling of no case to answer is proof that he was unlawfully arrested and detained and is entitled to be compensated by First and Second Respondents?
[5] I read the following Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, so far as relevant ―
″18 (2) ― The restriction, in accordance with fair procedures established by law, of the right under clause (1) in the following cases shall not be treated as an infringement of clause (1) ―
…
(b) the arrest or detention on reasonable suspicion of having committed or of being about to commit an offence for the purposes of investigation or preventing the commission of the offence and of producing, if necessary, the offender before a competent court;
…″.
"18 (7) ― A person who is produced before a court shall be released, either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, for appearance at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to a trial except where the court, having regard to the following circumstances, determines otherwise ―
(c) there are substantial grounds for believing that the suspect will fail to appear for the trial or will interfere with the witnesses or will otherwise obstruct the course of justice or will commit an offence while on release;
…″.
″18 (10) ― A person who has been unlawfully arrested or detained has a right to receive compensation from the person who unlawfully arrested or detained that person or from any other person or authority, including the State, on whose behalf or in the course of whose employment the unlawful arrest or detention was made or from both of them.″.
[6] I read paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Constitutional Petition ―
″7. The Petitioner avers that on the 1st August 2013, he was wrongfully arrested by the agents of the 1st Respondent whilst in the course of their employment with the 2nd Respondent and underwent 13½ (thirteen and a half) months in remand before being acquitted.
8. The Petitioner avers that every fortnight throughout the 13 and half months of pre-trial detention and periods of detention during the trial the 2nd Respondent requested and obtained ″his further remand″, without a proper evaluation of the facts and circumstances of his case.
9. On the 16th September 2014 the trial court acquitted him after he had served 13 ½ (thirteen and a half) months in custody on a no case to answer submission, finding that ″there is insufficient evidence to support a prima facie case against the Accused.
10. The Petitioner avers that under article 18 (10) of the Constitution he is a person who was unlawfully arrested and detained and has a right to receive compensation from the persons as averred above including the State, on whose behalf and in the course of whose employment the agents of the 1st and 2nd respondents were acting during the unlawful arrest and subsequent illegal detention.
11. The Petitioner avers that his subsequent acquittal by the trial court on the 16th September 2014, shows that he was the victim of an unlawful arrest and detention, and he is entitled to be compensated by the 1st and 2nd Respondents according to law.″.
[7] The Petitioner avers that he was ″wrongfully arrested by the agents of the 1st Respondent″; that ″his further remand″ was applied for and granted ″without a proper evaluation of the facts and circumstances of his case″; and that "his subsequent acquittal by the trial court on the 16th September 2014, shows that he was the victim of an unlawful arrest and detention". It is to be noted that the record of proceedings was not produced in this Constitutional case. Other than making those allegations, the Constitutional Petition makes no other complaints about the alleged unlawful arrest and detention of Petitioner.
[8] Respondents’ position is that Petitioner did not suffer constitutional hurt neither by reason of his arrest on 1 August, 2013, nor by his subsequent detention every fortnight after 2 August, 2013, until 16 September, 2014, when he was acquitted, by the Supreme Court, on a Ruling of no case to answer because there was reasonable and probable cause for his arrest, detention and prosecution. Hence, Petitioner is not entitled to be compensated under Article 18 (10) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.
[9] I have considered the arrest and detention of the Petitioner in light of the said provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles and the Criminal Procedure Code. In the circumstances I am satisfied that Respondents have proved that the arrest and detention of Petitioner was lawful and as for the evidence that Petitioner was acquitted on a Ruling of no case to answer, I am of the opinion that it is not evidence that there was no reasonable and probable cause for his arrest and detention.
[10] For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that Petitioner is not entitled to be compensated under Article 18 (10) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. Consequently, I dismiss the Constitutional Petition.
[11] I make no order as to cost.
Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 16 March, 2017.
F. Robinson
Judge of the Supreme Court