Amelie & Ors v Cable & Wireless (MA 259 of 2022 (Arising in CA 11 of 2022)) [2024] SCSC 48 (12 February 2024)

Adeline J,

            BACKGROUND

1. This is a notice of motion supported by an affidavit, by which Ralph Amelie and others, (“the Applicants”) apply to this court for an order setting aside the order of the Supreme Court made on the 5^th October 2022 in MA 203/2022 by which order, Cable & Wireless (Seychelles) Limited (“the Respondent”) was granted a stay of execution of the judgment of the Employment Tribunal delivered against it on the 13^th May 2022, by which an order was made for the Respondent to pay the Applicants a combined amount of SCR 6,503,175.67.
2. The Respondent who has since filed an appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Employment Tribunal as CA No 11 of 2022, opposes the application and prays for an order of this court dismissing the application with cost in its favour.
3. The affidavit in support of the application is sworn by the 1^st Applicant, one Ralph Amelie of Beau Vallon, Mahe, Seychelles who in his deposition, inter alia, makes the following averments;

“1….

2….

3….

4. On the 13 May 2022, the Employment Tribunal delivered the judgment in respect of a number of applicationS lodged by myself and the other applicants (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Applicants) against Cable & Wireless (Seychelles) Limited (hereinafter the Respondent), ordering the Respondent to pay a combined sum of SR6,503,175.67 to the Applicants.

5. The Respondent lodged an appeal against the judgment on 27 May 2022.

6. The Applicants applied for execution of the judgment and on 19 September 2022, as part of execution of the judgment, a warrant of levy was presented to the Respondent.

7. As a result the process of execution of the judgment, as mentioned in paragraph 6 above, the Respondent issued a cheque in the sum of SR6,503,175.67 on the 19 September 2022.

8. The issue of the cheque means, that the Respondent has complied with the judgment.

9. Consequent to the issue of the cheque, the Respondent filed a motion on 20 September 2022 for stay of execution of the judgment (hereinafter the “application for stay of execution”).

10. On 5^th October 2022, the application for stay of execution was called for the second time before the Supreme Court and on that date, Miss Vel stood in for our counsel Basil Hoareau. This was the first time that an appearance was being marked on our behalf in respect of the said application, but unfortunately the court did not grant us an opportunity to file a reply to the application for stay of execution, but proceeded to make an order granting a stay of execution of the judgment, it is now shown to me, produced, exhibited respectively as –

(a) RA1 a copy of the Supreme Court proceedings of 28 September 2022; and

(b) RA2 a copy of the Supreme Court proceedings of 5 October 2022;

    in respect of the application for stay of execution.

11. Moreover, the Supreme Court made the order for stay of execution of the judgment without properly considering all the facts of the case as to whether there were grounds to grant a stay of execution.

12. The Supreme Court did not take into account that –

(a) the Respondent had issued a cheque in the amount of the total sum awarded to the Applicants in the judgment; and

(b) the cheque was issued during the course of execution of the judgment.

13. After issuing the cheque, the Respondent instituted this application malifide, as disclosed in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the affidavit of Martin Laurence, sworn in support of the application for stay of execution.

14. Furthermore, if we the Applicants are granted the opportunity to file our objection to the application for stay of execution, we would establish that there are no grounds upon which a stay of execution can be granted.

15. On the basis of all the above, this Honourable Court granted the stay of execution, contrary to our right to a fair hearing and the principle of natural justice.

4. In opposition to the application, the Respondent filed an affidavit in reply objecting to the grant of the order being sought for. The affidavit is sworn by one Martin Laurence who, inter alia, depones as follows;

“2. That I occupy the post of Director, Legal Regulatory, and Corporate Compliance of the Respondent Company and I am authorised to make the affidavit on behalf of the Respondent Company.

3. That the Employment Tribunal gave judgment on the 13^th May 2022 and that we have filed an appeal against the said judgment to the Supreme Court on the 27^th May 2022.

4. That on the 19^th September 2022, a warrant of levy was presented to the Respondent company. That the Respondent was informed that its assets such as its vehicles would be seized, these are necessary for the Respondent in order for it to carry out its trade. Accordingly, in order to avoid disruptions to its business undertakings, the Respondent made out a cheque of SR 6,503,175.67 in favour of the Registry of the Supreme Court.

5. That I was quite surprised to receive the warrant of levy because at the time, the Respondent Company and the Applicants were in the process of seeking to resolve the matter amicably. In fact, we were waiting for a response from the Applicants when they surprised us with the application to execute.

6. That I am informed by the Respondent’s counsel, Mr Divino Sabino, that on the 5^th October 2022, the case was set for mention, the Applicants were represented by counsel and that they did not specifically object to the granting of the stay of execution.

7. That this application is therefore seeking to re-determine a court order due to the inadvertence, lack of diligence or instructions of opposing counsel at the time that the stay was granted.

8. That this application should therefore be dismissed with costs”.

5. In an attempt to figure out what the Applicant’s contentious issues are, I have paid particular attention to paragraphs 10,11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Mr Amelie’s affidavit in support of the application. Having read these averments, it is clear to me, that Mr Amelie concedes that on the 5^th October 2022, learned counsel, Ms Vel stood for counsel, Mr Basil Hoareau who represents the Applicants. However, he then goes on as to say;

“but unfortunately the court did not grant us an opportunity to file a reply to the application for stay of execution, but proceeded to make an order granting stay of execution of the judgment …”

6. Therefore, Mr Amelie’s first allegation, is that, prior to the making of the order to stay execution of the judgment on the 5^th October 2022, the court did not grant the Applicants an opportunity to file a reply to the application.
7. In addition, based on the averment at paragraph 11 in Mr Amelie’s affidavit, he alleges, that “the court made the order for a stay of execution of the judgment without properly considering all the facts of the case as to whether there were grounds to grant a stay of execution”.
8. It is the contention of Mr Amelie, that should the court grant the Applicants the opportunity to file their objection to the application for a stay, “they would establish that there are no grounds upon which a stay of execution can be granted”.
9. Mr Amelie also claims, that the Respondent made the application for a stay malafide, and that the grant of the stay of execution was “contrary to their right to a fair hearing and the principles of natural justice”.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT

10. In its oral submission on behalf of the Applicants, learned counsel began by rehearsing the historical background of the case starting from the 13^th May 2022 when the employment tribunal delivered its judgment in favour of the Applicants, up to the 5^th October 2022, when the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution of the judgment by making the appropriate order. It was learned counsel’s submission, that the Respondent lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the employment tribunal on the 27^th May 2023, at a time when the Applicants had already initiated due process to execute the judgment.
11. It was submitted by learned counsel, that as part of the execution process, on the 19^th September 2022, a warrant of levy was issues by the Registrar of the Supreme Court, and upon the Respondent being presented with the same, on the same day, the Respondent issued a cheque in the sum of 6,503,175.67 to be paid to the Applicants in order to comply with the judgment. It was also submitted by learned counsel, that the following day, the 20^th September 2022, the Respondent filed in court an application by way of notice of motion supported by an affidavit for a stay of execution of the judgment, which application, was called before the court for the first time on the 28^th September 2022.
12. It was the contention of learned counsel, making references to paragraph 7 of Mr Amelie’s affidavit, that the issuing of the cheque by the Respondent, means, that the Respondent had pay. Learned counsel referred the court to paragraph 10 of Mr Amelie’s affidavit by which he avers, that on the 5^th October 2022 the application for a stay of execution was called for the 2^nd time, and that this time around, and for the first time, the Applicants were represented by counsel, Ms Olivia Vel, who stood for Mr Hoareau.
13. Relying on Mr Amelie’s averment at paragraph 10 of his affidavit, it was submitted by learned counsel, that the court did not grant the Applicants an opportunity to be heard by giving them the opportunity to file a reply to the application for a stay of execution, but rather, swiftly proceeded to make the order effectively granting a stay of execution. Learned counsel invited the court to pay attention to the record of the proceedings of the 28^th September 2022, when the application was called for the first time.
14. Learned counsel refers the court to the record of the proceedings pertaining to the exchanges that took place between the bench and the mover of the motion, learned counsel Mr Sabino Divino. I find no need to replicate the exchanges in its entirety. Suffice, however, to quote the extract which learned counsel for the Applicants did put emphasis on his endeavour to have the order of stay of execution set aside. This is the relevant extract quoted by learned counsel for the Applicant;

“Court: We will find out and let me know. I will call the case in two weeks time.

Mr Divino: My Lord in the meantime can the status quo be kept?

Court: Yes, yes, yes,

Court: Status quo. I do not mind giving the stay but it is better that the other party is present. But we will quickly finish with this matter. If you delay, I will proceed to give order in their absence. Anyway, we go step by step. See that your lawyer is present. I will call the case in one week because I do not want to delay. Till then there is a stay”.

15. In reliance on this extract taken from the record of the proceedings, it was by learned counsel, that the court had already made the order for a stay on the 28^th September 2022 when the court said the following;

“Till then, there is a stay”.

16. It was argued by learned counsel, that the court, in effect, granted an interim stay of execution without having heard or even considered the merits of the application after giving a clear indication that it is very much minded to grant a stay of execution, when it said, “yes, yes, yes” and added, the following statement;

“I do not mind giving the stay, but it is better that the party is present”.

17. With emphasis on this statement, it was the submission of learned counsel, that the court had already made up its mind when the case was called for the first time on the 28^th September 2022, but did not do it for the reason it stated which is on record, quoted by learned counsel to be following;

“I will not make it in the absence of the other party. I want them to be present”.

18. It was also the submission of learned counsel, that having said that, the court then proceeded to grant an “interim stay”. Learned counsel sought to substantiate his contention quoting the following statement which he said the court made as per the record of the proceedings;

“See that your lawyers are present. I will call this case in one week because I don’t want to delay. Till then, there is a stay”.

19. In his submissions, learned counsel then proceeded to address the court on what, according to the record of the proceedings, transpired in court on the 5^th October 2022 when the case was called for the 2^nd time and Ms Olivia Vel stood for him for the Applicants. Learned counsel quoted the following extract of the proceedings and referred that court to the same, which extract is replicated hereunder;

“Court: Okay, so now we will proceed. Usually there is an appeal from the tribunal, and I am informing you that I am issuing a stay pending the decision of this appeal”.

20. It was submitted by learned counsel, that looking at the record of the proceedings, Ms Vel then said, “ok”. It was the contention of learned counsel, that based on the records of the proceedings, it is his belief, that the court already made its decision and that the same was being conveyed to Ms Vel who stood for him. Learned counsel stated, that his belief is based on the statement made by the court when it said the following;

“I am informing you, I am going to make that stay”.

21. Learned counsel then referred the court to other aspects of the record of the proceedings quoting the following;

“Court: But I cannot 11.13.40 inform Mr Hoareau to come. So inform him that I am issuing a stay order pending his admission of his appeal. We will try to conclude this as quickly as possible. So who go first? Appellant? Who is Appellant? Cable!”

22. Besides submitting on what can be termed as the factual issues to be considered for the court to determine this application, learned counsel sought to clear any doubt as to whether, in the first place, this court does have jurisdiction to set aside its own order. Learned counsel relied on the case of Bristol v Rosenbauer (SCA MA 28 of 2021 [2022] SCCA 23 (29 April 2022) and submitted, that this court does have an inherent power to set aside its own judgment for serious irregularity. Learned counsel also cited the case of Easter European Engineering Limited vs Vijay Construction (Proprietary) Limited [2022], SCCA 56 (21 October 2022, SCA MA 35/2022 (Arising in SCA MA 24/2020) stating, that the position as regards to the Court of Appeal is now settled too, in that, it is established that the Court of Appeal too has the inherent powers to set aside its own judgment or order for serious irregularities. It was the submission of learned counsel, that such powers are derived from Section 4 of the Courts Act that confers on this court the same powers, privileges, jurisdiction and authority as the High Court of England.
23. Learned counsel, also cited the case of Attorney General vs Joseph Marzorcchi and Charles Marzorcchi quoting from the ruling, the following extract;

“Further, where a procedural irregularity of the nature complained of has occurred, as in this case, a judgment or an order given in these proceedings, must surely be treated as a nullity. In the circumstances, the court must exercise its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the said judgment or order”.

Learned counsel then proceeded to refer to paragraph 556 of the Halsbury’s laws of England, Vol.26, 4^th Edition quoting the following extract that reads as follows;

“Where there has been some procedural irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the judgment or order which is so serious that the judgment or order ought ot be treated as nullity, the court will set aside”.

24. Learned counsel submitted, that there was a serious irregularity in the proceedings of the 5^th October 2022 when the court made the order granting a stay of execution because the Respondents were never given an opportunity to be heard to place their stance or position on record, given that for all intent and purposes, they intended to oppose and object to the application. This, as learned counsel put it, was a breach of the Applicant’s (previously the Respondents) right to a fair hearing as well as the principle of natural justice. It was submitted by learned counsel, that the granting of a stay of execution order by the court was a “fait accomplie” without the court considering the merits of the application, and given a reasoned decision.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

25. In his submission opposing and objecting to the application for the stay of execution order to be set aside, learned counsel for the Respondent makes specific mention of paragraph 6 and 7 of Mr Martin Laurence’s affidavit by which he avers, that “on the 5^th October 2022, when the case was set for mention, the Applicants were represented by counsel, and they did not specifically object to the granting of the stay of execution. Learned counsel added, that as per the averment at paragraph 7 of Mr Laurence’s affidavit, the present application is seeking to have a court order re-determined in advertence due to lack of diligence or instructions of opposing counsel at the time that the court granted the stay.
26. It was the contention of learned counsel for the Respondent, that the other side, (meaning the Applicant in this case), was given every opportunity to respond to the application for a stay of execution but did not take up the opportunity. This, as per learned counsel’s submission, is borne out of the transcript of the 5^th October 2022 when counsel, Ms Olivia Vel did put appearance for the Applicants (previously the Respondents) as she stood up and said that “she was standing for Mr Basil Hoareau”. Learned counsel quoted the court having said the following;

“Court: Okay, so now then, we will proceed. Usually there is an appeal from the Employment. Usually there is a 11.34.00 informing that I am issuing a stay order pending decision of this appeal, okay?”

27. Learned counsel submitted, that by using the word “ok?” with a question mark, the court was effectively asking the other side, “whether they are ok, or fine with the stay being granted, and that at that point, the other side had every opportunity to say no we are not ok, or I want to object, may I have time to reply”. Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that he was personally shocked when he heard Ms Vel simply saying, “I shall inform Mr Hoareau” and that was because he was expecting her to say that they want to object, and want time to reply.
28. On the law, particularly on the issue whether or not, a court can void or set aside its own judgment or order, it was the submission of learned counsel for the Respondent, that it is well settled law, that both, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have the inherent powers to set aside their own judgment or order where there has been “a serious irregularity”, and that there are local jurisprudence to back this proposition up.
29. Learned counsel submitted, that serious procedural irregularity must have occurred through no fault of a party, and that required the court to satisfy itself, that it is not to be blamed for the situation that the Applicants have put themselves in.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

30. I have thoroughly and repeatedly read the record of the proceedings of the 28^th September 2022 when the application for a stay of execution of the judgment of the employment tribunal delivered on the 13 May 2022 was mentioned for the first time before the Supreme Court, and the record of the proceedings of the 5^th October 2022 when the court actually granted the application and made the order. As I read the submissions of learned counsel representing the parties to this application, I wonder what would have been the argument for and against the granting of the application to set aside the order of the stay of execution if counsel representing the Applicants was representing the Respondent on the defensive side of the equation, and counsel representing the Respondent was representing the Applicant on the offensive side of the equation to convince the court to set aside the order of the stay of execution.
31. Whichever side one may be or could have been, the fact remains, that there are two sets of opposing arguments which has been laid before this court which the court has to consider to decide whether or not the application should succeed. In spite the forceful arguments of counsels, it is however comforted to note, that on the law, there is no disagreement between them. They both agree, that this court does have inherent powers to set aside its own judgment or order. In fact, this legal position is firmly established by a host of case law authorities notably, the case of Andre Bristol v Ellen Rosenbauer (Supra) and most recently, the Court of Appeal case of Eastern European Engineering Limited (Supra) all of which were correctly cited by learned counsel for the Applicants. Therefore, if there was any doubt as to whether the Court of Appeal as the apex court had the power to set aside its own judgment or order, this has now been cleared by the case of Eastern European Engineering, and the principle is well settled.
32. For these reasons, therefore, I will not venture into an elaborate repetition and discussion of the law about whether this court can legally and lawfully do what it is being asked to do by the Applicants. Rather, the next part of my discussion is devoted on when, and in what circumstances, can this court exercise its inherent powers to set aside its own judgment or order. Relying on these case law authorities cited, learned counsel for the Applicants submitted, that the application before this court is one that falls within the ambit of the principles established by these authorities, in that, “a serious irregularity” has occurred that warrant the setting aside the order of the stay of execution. In his submissions, learned counsel for the Respondent stated, that in its quest to find out whether or not a serious procedural irregularity has occurred, the court must look at the whole facts and circumstances of the case as it unfolded in the proceedings of the 28^th September 2022, and 5^th October 2023.
33. It was the submission of learned counsel, that the “serious procedural irregularity” must have been of no fault of a party which in the instant case, clearly, counsel Ms Olivia Vel was at fault. Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted, that when the court asked Ms Vel if it’s okay for the court to grant a stay of execution, her answer was “I shall inform Mr Hoareau”. It was the contention of learned counsel, that Ms Vel could have said, for example, “I want time to file a reply or I am objecting to the making of the order” which she failed to do, and therefore, failed to take the opportunity for her to be heard. As such, it was the submission of learned counsel, that the court was right to suppose that there was no issue or problem with the granting of the order for a stay of execution. In essence, it was the submission of leaned counsel for the Respondent, that it was incumbent on the Applicants to this application to “establish serious irregularities” which they failed to do.
34. I will now proceed to examine closely the averments made by the deponent in its affidavit in support of the application, the averments made by the deponent opposing and objecting to the application, and the submissions of counsels in the light of the record of the proceedings. Learned counsel for the Applicant has argued vigorously and forcefully, that based on the record of the proceedings of the 28^th September 2022, and 5^th October 2022, there has been “a serious irregularity because prior to the making of the order for a stay of execution, the Applicants were not given the opportunity to be heard by allowing them to reply to the application and that was in breach of their constitutional right to a fair hearing and the principle of natural justice.
35. Within the background of learned counsel’s contention, I have had sight of the record of proceedings of the 28^th September 2022. Clearly, some of the Applicants (previously Respondents) including the deponent himself, Mr Ralph Amelie, were present in court on the day the application was first mentioned before the court on the 28^th September 2022. In fact, when asked by the court, is your lawyer Mr Basil Hoareau?, his answer was;

“Yes we have been told that notice has been served on him, we have not seen him, we have not discussed anything with him yet. We do not know exactly what has happened since last week”.

36. The exchanges that then took place between the bench and counsel for the Respondent (previously the Applicant) is this;

“My Lord in the meantime can the status quo be kept?

Court: Yes, yes, yes. Status quo in fact I do not mind giving the stay but it is better that the other party is present. But we will quickly finish with this matter. If you delay, I will proceed to give order in their absence. Anyway, we go step by step. See that your lawyers are present and I will call the case in 1 week because I do not want to delay it, till then there is a stay”.

37. It was the contention of learned counsel for the Applicants, that that was an interim stay, and that it was made without having heard the merits of the application. In learned counsel’s view, the court had already made up its mind and gave a clear indication that it was very much minded to grant the stay being sought for. It is observed, however, that when these exchanges were taking place in court between the bench and counsel for the Respondent (previously the Applicant) Mr Amelie was present in court and could have at least sought for leave to address the court stating out their position. He did not. The presence of Mr Amelie in court without him indicating to the court that the Applicants intend to object or oppose the application, means, that the court could have made the order for a stay of execution given that, effectively, the Applicants waived their right of reply by not saying anything when the application was called.
38. The fact that the court had said “till then there is a stay”, this is construed by learned counsel for the Applicants that the court effectively made an interim order for a stay of execution. It could well have been the case, albeit speculatively, that this was on the basis of the court’s finding that Mr Amelie who appeared in person before the court on the 28^th September 2022, who could have responded to the application said nothing about the application for a stay. Nonetheless, if at all the court did make an interim order for a stay of execution, the fact that the court indicated that “it doesn’t mind giving the stay but that it is better that the other party is present” the court effectively wanted learned counsel representing the other side, the Respondents then, to be present to have their say.
39. Therefore, the Applicants having been served and made themselves available in court could have made their stance known to the bench. The court could well had been minded to make the order for a stay of execution but only chose to make an interim order, if at all it made one, because the Respondents then did not respond to the application and told the court that Mr Hoareau would represent them. The proposition that the court made the order without considering the merit of the application is somewhat speculative because the fact that the record of the proceedings does not expressly address the merit of the application doesn’t follow that the court did not consider the merit of the application.
40. I have also examined the record of the proceedings of the 5^th October 2022 when the application was called for the 2^nd time. On that day, learned counsel, Ms Olivia Vel, put up appearance in court standing for counsel for the Applicants, Mr Basil Hoareau. The verbal exchanges that took place between Ms Vel and the bench is the following;

“Ms Vel: My Lord, may it pleases you, I am standing for Mr Hoareau in this matter. I do apologise for my tardiness.

Court: Standing for?

Ms Vel: Mr Basil Hoareau. He is appearing for the Respondent.

Court: That’s correct.

Court: Okay, so now, then we will proceed. Usually there is an appeal from the Employment Tribunal and I am informing you that I am issuing a stay order pending the decision of this appeal. Okay?

Ms Vel: I shall inform Mr Hoareau.

Court: But I cannot be waiting for Mr Hoareau to come, so inform Mr Hoareau that I am issuing a stay order pending determination of this appeal. We will try to conclude this as quickly as possible. So you go first. The appellant who is the Applicant, you, Cable and Wireless”. 

41. Learned counsel for the Respondent did say, that learned counsel, Ms Vel, could have said something that would have alerted the court that it is not okay to make the order for a stay of execution. Instead, she simply said, “I will inform Mr Hoareau”. It is my considered opinion, that had counsel acted with due diligence, the court would not have made the order for a stay, and this application would not have been before this court. Even if the court is to agree with learned counsel for the Applicants that the court was minded to make the order for a stay of execution on the day the application was first mentioned before it on the 28^th September 2022 and that was followed through leading to the making of the order on the 5^th October 2022, it is a fact that the court made the order granting a stay of execution because learned counsel who was standing for counsel for the Respondents then, failed to object to the making of the order. However, to be fair to Ms Vel, the question that remains unanswered, is, was she properly instructed?  
42. In essence, whether or not this application should succeed, revolves around ones interpretation of the events that unfolded in the proceedings of the 28^th September 2022 and 5^th October 2022. Learned counsel from both sides have given their own interpretations and made their own conclusions. Learned counsel for the Applicants, Mr Basil Hoareau, did agree, on record, to the proposition that if he had been present on the 5^th October 2022, he would have intervened and resisted the application. By implications, this means, that counsel, Ms Vel, by not opposing the application failed to act diligently, and therefore, it was because of her fault that the order for a stay of execution was made.
43. For these reasons, I am unable to subscribe to learned counsel for the Applicants’ view that “serious procedural irregularity occurred” in the proceedings leading to the making of the order for a stay of execution, and certainly, no proof of the same has been put before this court. I find, that there was a lack of due diligence by counsel who stood for Mr Basil Hoareau in the proceeding of the 5^th October 2022 because she did not express her opposition to the making of the order, let alone asking for time to file a reply. As to learned counsel’s proposition that the court did not consider the merit of the application before granting the stay, this court is not persuaded, that learned counsel has been able to substantiate the same with facts. It appears, that the basis for his contention is the fact that the record of proceedings does not say anything about the merit of the application.
44. It is obviously clear, nonetheless, that the grant of the stay of execution order by the court was on account of the Applicant (now the Respondent) uncontroverted affidavit evidence. Therefore, I am unable to agree with learned counsel for the Applicants that the Applicants were denied their constitutional right to a fair hearing by being denied their right to be heard. They instructed counsel and were given the opportunity to be heard through counsel who did not take the opportunity which as a consequence, allowed the court to make the order without any objection.
45. In the circumstances, the application to set aside the order granting a stay of execution of the judgment of the employment tribunal made on the 5^th October 2022 fails, and is accordingly dismissed.

 

Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 9 February 2024.

 

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Adeline J